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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section 
1 x J 2(3)(a) and (5), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). This Court has exercised 
:r '-so <-oiiiii i.iuliiiiMlii Nnejisous IVhlion lui \\\ I ol t ertiorari, pursuant to Rule 45 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Only one issue was granted for review in this case: 
1. \Uirlhii Hi i l mi in \ mi in I.I mi ml \ .ml •*,: ; •-. ase required that any vote to 
amend them take place prior to 12:01 Januan >04? 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
I lie issue in this case involves the interpretation of the Restrictive Covenants, 
whicli IS;I question nt \\\\\ • \v\ if1 wed Ion oiavtness, t *WJI w Meadows t lame Owners Assoc. 
\>. Wasatch City, 40 P.3d 1146 (Utah 2001). 
PRESERVATION FOR REVIEW 
I he issue presented above was preserved for review. The Petitioners, 
Swensons, filedaMotiof'1 In Ni'llif\ Nolu v nnVimiiiiilmn ol Rt'stndiu'l owtiants, basal 
upon several grounds, including the fact that the Restrictive Covenants were automatically 
renewed for another successive ten (10) year period commencing on January 1,2004 at 12:01 
i in k'loie (he ;illrt»nl majority vote was taken on January 1, 2004. (Rec. 41-50). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Proceedings 
Prior appeal, Swenson 7. This case involves the enforcement of Restrictive 
Covenants filed on property in Salt Lake County, known as the Quail Point Subdivision. The 
Plaintiffs, and Petitioners herein, ("S wensons") brought a previous action in 1997 to enforce 
the Restrictive Covenants and prevent their neighbor Erickson from building a large 
workshop in his backyard, obstructing their view of the mountains. Swenson v. Erickson, 
998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000). (See copy of case attached, Addendum, Ex. "B"). In the previous 
action the trial court found that the large workshop Erickson was building was in violation 
of the Restrictive Covenants. 
A Temporary Restraining Order was issued by the trial court and then a 
preliminary injunction hearing was held on September 4, 1997, wherein the court granted 
Swensons a Preliminary Injunction. The trial court ruled, among other things, that the 
Restrictive Covenants strictly prohibited the building of such a structure; and that the 
structure was not a private garage, a guest house, or an outbuilding for pets as designated 
under Article I of the Restrictive Covenants. (See copy of Restrictive Covenants attached, 
Addendum, Ex. "A", pg. 1). 
Subsequent to the court's granting of the preliminary injunction, Erickson 
caused Robert Campbell, as a newly appointed architectural committee member, to file a 
Notice of Termination of the Restrictive Covenants, dated October 3, 1997. This was done 
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even though the Restrictive Covenants on January 1, 1994, had been renewed for a 
successive ten (10) year period, through December 31, 2003. Erickson then filed a Motion 
to Dismiss the Complaint, and to Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order and/or 
Preliminary Injunction, alleging that the Notice of Termination terminated the Restrictive 
Covenants. 
Swensons in turn filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Erickson's Motion to 
Dismiss and filed a Motion to Nullify the Notice of Termination of Restrictive Covenants, 
pursuant to Section 38-9-7 U.C.A. (1953, as amended). The Motion to Nullify was based, 
among other things, on the fact that the Restrictive Covenants automatically renewed for a 
successive ten (10) year period on January 1, 1994, through December 31, 2003, and 
therefore could not be terminated by a majority vote during the ten (10) year renewal period. 
The trial court granted Erickson's Motion to Dismiss, but failed to address 
Swensons' Motion to Nullify the Notice of Termination of Restrictive Covenants and failed 
to rule on whether or not the Restrictive Covenants were still valid. 
The Swensons appealed the trial court's decision and on appeal the Utah 
Supreme Court ruled that the structure was in violation of the Restrictive Covenants and that 
the Restrictive Covenants were not terminated, but were automatically renewed on January 
1, 1994 for a period often (10) years. The Utah Supreme Court goes on to state: "the 
owners have the power to amend the covenants, but only at such time as the covenants are 
due for extension. The last such time was January 1, 2004; we assume that the next such 
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time will be on January 1, 2004. This being so, the petition, assuming it represents a 
majority vote of the owners, is still invalid. The owner's attempted termination of the 
restrictive covenants is without effect. Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, at 815 (Utah 
2000). (Addendum, Ex. "B"). 
The case was remanded back down to district court for the entry of a permanent 
injunction, which was entered by the Third District Court on August 31, 2000. Since, the 
entry of the Permanent Injunction, Erickson again attempted to terminate the Restrictive 
Covenants by a majority vote which was taken on January 1,2004. 
The Present Case. The Complaint in this matter was filed on February 6,2004 
(Rec. 1 -9). Another Notice of Termination of Restrictive Covenants was filed on March 26, 
2004 (Rec. 33); and a First Amended Complaint was filed on April 27,2004, (Rec. 10-36) 
seeking Declaratory Relief as before, on the Notice of Termination. (Rec. 15). 
On May 10, 2004, Swensons filed their Motion to Nullify the Notice of 
Termination and their Memorandum in Support. (Rec. 41-50). On June 11, 2004, the 
Defendants filed their Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Nullify Notice of Termination of 
Restrictive Covenants. (Rec. 58-77). Swensons filed their Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Nullify Notice of Termination of Restrictive Covenants on June 22, 2004. 
(Rec. 78-106). On September 20,2004, the court heard oral argument on Swensons' Motion 
to Nullify and took the matter under advisement. (Rec. 117). 
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On October 25, 2004, the court rendered its decision (Rec. 118-121) finding 
that since the Covenants allow for a change "in whole or in part", that this is inclusive of 
termination; and thus the Covenants do allow for termination by a majority vote. (Rec. 120) 
(See a complete copy of the trial court's Order attached, Addendum, Ex. "D"). 
The court further ruled that although the vote to terminate was conducted 
during the day of January 1,2004, it was still effective. (Rec. 120) The trial court relied on 
the Utah Supreme Court's statement in the previous case, wherein the Court states: 
"[T]he owners have the power to amend the covenants, but only 
at such time as the covenants are due for extension. The last time 
was January 1, 1994; we assume that the next such time will be 
on January 1, 2004." (Rec. 120) (See Add. Ex. "D" pg. 3) 
As a result of the trial court's ruling on the Notice of Termination, on 
November 17,2004, the trial court entered an Order of Dismissal in the case. (Rec. 123). On 
November 23, 2004 a Notice of Appeal was filed by the Swensons, appealing the trial 
court's ruling and Order of October 25,2004. (Rec. 125). 
The Utah Court of Appeals issued its Opinion on February 2, 2006, and in 
reliance of the same language in Swenson /, affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that 
both the renewal and the majority vote to terminate the Covenants could occur on the same 
day, January 1, 2004; and since there was no specific time set forth for the renewal of the 
Covenants, that the vote, which took place between noon and 2:00 p.m., was effective to 
terminate the Covenants. (See Opinion by Utah Court of Appeals, Addendum Ex. E). 
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On March 2, 2006, the Swensons filed their Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
which was granted as to the issue of, "whether the Covenants at issue in this case required 
that any vote to amend them take place prior to 12:01 a.m. on January 1, 2004." 
Statement of the Facts 
1. The Plaintiffs ("Swensons") are owners of Lot 21 in the Quail Point 
Subdivision ("Subdivision"), and reside on the lot in a single family residence, which has 
a street address of 9135 Morningview Drive, Sandy, Utah 84094. (Rec. 10 & 12). 
2. The Defendant, David V. Erickson ("Erickson") is the owner of Lot 26 in 
the Subdivision and resides on the lot in a single family residence, which has a street 
address of 9150 South Mockingbird Circle, Sandy, Utah 84094. (Rec. 10 & 12). 
3. The Defendant, David R. Limberg ("Limberg") is the owner of Lot 27 in 
the Subdivision and resides on the lot in a single family residence, which has a street 
address of 9144 South Mockingbird Circle, Sandy, Utah 84094. (Rec. 10 & 12). 
4. The Subdivision was created on July 9, 1973, by Kirton Land 
Development and Investment Corporation. Harold M. Campbell and Mary Campbell, the 
owners of a certain tract of land located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more fully 
described as follows: 
Lots 1 through 52, QUAIL POINT SUBDIVISION, a 
subdivision of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, according to 
the official plat thereof on file and of record in the Office of 
the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
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plated and subdivided the tract by filing a map and plat of the tract in the Office of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder, State of Utah. (Rec. 2). 
5. Pursuant to Kirton Land Development and Investment Corporation and the 
Campbell's purpose of creating uniform restrictions upon the use and improvement of the 
tract, and for the benefit of all of the lots in the tract, and the owners and the purchasers 
of lots in that tract, Kirton Land Development and Investment Corporation and the 
Campbells, recorded, on July 9 1973, Quail Point Subdivision Restrictive Covenants 
("Restrictive Covenants"), which are recorded in Book 3368 at Page 429 through 432. 
(Rec. 2). See Restrictive Covenants contained in the Record (Rec. 17-20) and attached 
hereto in the Addendum, as Ex. "A". 
6. The Swensons, and Erickson and Limberg, acquired their interest in their 
lots with notice and knowledge of the Restrictive Covenants filed on the Subdivision. 
(Rec. 3). 
7. In the past, Erickson, commenced building a workshop on his property in 
direct violation of the Restrictive Covenants, which did not allow any structure to be 
erected on the lots, "other than one detached single-family dwelling, a private garage, a 
guest house and out buildings for pets." (Rec. 4 & 12).(Add. Ex. "A", pg. 1). 
8. To enforce the Restrictive Covenants on the property the Swensons filed 
suit in the Third District Court, and obtained an injunction against Erickson from building 
his workshop. Case No. 970905359CV. (Rec. 13). 
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9. After the injunction was issued, Erickson attempted to terminate the 
Restrictive Covenants by filing a Notice of Termination, by a claimed majority, with the 
Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on October 6, 1997. The Third District Court based 
on the Notice of Termination, dismissed the action; and Swensons appealed. Appeal No. 
980075. (Rec. 13). 
10. On appeal the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the structure Erickson was 
building was in violation of the Restrictive Covenants, and further found that the attempt 
to terminate the Covenants by a majority of the property owners in October of 1997 was 
of no effect, because the Covenants had been automatically extended for 10 years on 
January 1, 1994 through December 31, 2003. This was a published decision. Swenson v. 
Erickson, 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000) ^Swenson F herein). This is in the Record (Rec. 
21-30) and is also attached hereto, in the Addendum as Ex. "B". 
11. The case was remanded to the district court for the entry of a permanent 
injunction, which was entered by the Third District Court on August 31, 2000. The 
Permanent Injunction also provides for costs and attorney's fees incurred to enforce the 
Order. (Rec. 13). The Permanent Injunction is located in the Record. (Rec. 31-32). 
12. Since the entry of the Permanent Injunction Order, Erickson and Limberg 
have again attempted to terminate the Restrictive Covenants by a majority vote, which 
was allegedly taken after 12:01 a.m. on January 1, 2004, between 12:00 noon and 2:00 
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p.m., after the Restrictive Covenants were already automatically renewed for another 10 
year period on January 1, 2004. (Rec. 14). 
13 On March 26, 2004, another Notice of Termination of Restrictive 
Covenants was filed on the property in the Subdivision, claiming that the Restrictive 
Covenants were terminated by a majority vote of the owners on January 1,2004. (Rec. 
15). A copy of the Notice of Termination is contained in the Record (Rec. 33), and 
attached hereto in the Addendum, as Ex. "C". 
14. The vote allegedly occurred on January 1, 2004 from 12:00 noon through 
2:00 p.m. The vote was not to amend the Covenants, but to terminate the Covenants. 
(Rec. 15). A copy of the official ballot is contained in the Record. (Rec. 34-36). 
15. The Restrictive Covenants provide that as of January 1, 2004, they are 
automatically renewed for an additional ten (10) year period. (Rec. 19, and Addendum. 
Ex. "A", pg. 3). 
16. The Restrictive Covenants were never amended or terminated prior to 
January 1, 2004 at 12:01 a.m., at which time the next successive 10 year period 
commenced. (Rec. 15). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The majority vote to terminate the Restrictive Covenants in this case, did 
not occur until after January 1, 2004 at 12:01 a.m., at which point the Covenants were 
automatically extended for another ten (10) year renewal period. Since the ten (10) year 
renewal period had already commenced at the start of January 1, 2004, and before the 
vote was taken from 12:00 noon to 2:00 p.m. that same day, the vote taken was too late 
and is ineffective to terminate the Covenants. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COVENANTS AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE REQUIRE 
THAT A MAJORITY VOTE TO TERMINATE TAKE PLACE 
PRIOR TO 12:01 A.M. ON JANUARY 1, 2004 AT WHICH 
TIME THE COVENANTS AUTOMATICALLY RENEWED. 
A. The Covenants were already renewed by noon 
on January 1 2004. when the vote occurred. 
It must not be forgotten that while restrictive covenants forbid or require 
certain use of real property, they also confer vested rights in those owners who desire to 
own property where the subject uses are either required or forbidden. One of these vested 
rights is the method required to amend, change or abolish the covenants. In re Wallace's 
Fourth Southmoor Addition, 874 P.2d 818, 821 (Okl.App. 1994). 
Restrictive covenants are interpreted in the same manner as contracts. 
Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000). The Interpretation of unambiguous 
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contractual terms is a question of law. Canyon Meadows Home Owners Assoc, v. 
Wasatch City., 40 P.3d 1146 (Utah 2001). 
Unambiguous restrictive covenants should be enforced as written. It is the 
court's duty to enforce the intention of the parties as expressed in the plain language of 
the covenants. Such language is to be taken in its ordinary, generally understood and 
popular sense, and it is not to be subjected to technical refinement nor are the words to be 
torn away from their association and their separate meanings sought in a lexicon. 
Holladay Duplex Mfg. Co. v. Howells, 47 P.3d 104 (Ut.App. 2003); Freeman v. Gee 423 
P.2d 155 (Utah 1967). 
The unambiguous terms of the Covenants in this case, provide that they 
automatically renew for a successive ten (10) year period on January 1,2004. The 
Covenants specifically provide as follows: 
These covenants are to run with the land and shall be binding on all parties 
and all persons claiming under them until January 1, 1994, at which time said 
covenants shall be automatically extended for successive periods of 10 years 
unless by a vote of a majority of the then owners of the building sites covered by 
these covenants it is agreed to change said covenants in whole or part. [Emphasis 
added]. (Rec. 19, Addendum Ex. A, pg. 3). 
This provision should be enforced as written. Other courts in reviewing 
restrictive covenants, with the same language, have held that the amendment must be 
voted on and ratified by the majority before the automatic renewal period commences. 
City of Gulf Port v. Wilson, 603 So.2d 295, 300 (Miss. 1992). Indeed, the word "until" 
given its ordinary meaning is defined by Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary as "a 
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function word to indicate the continuance of an action or condition to a specified date or 
time." Other dictionaries define "until" as "up to a time or event, but not afterward," and 
"before a time or event, but not afterward," and "up to the stated time, but not after," and 
"prior to a stated time." See Merriam-Webster, Cambridge Advanced Learner 
Dictionaries, and The Encarta Premier Dictionaries. 
The Covenants in this case were to run with the land and be binding on all 
parties and all persons claiming under them until January 1,1994, at which time they are 
automatically renewed. Therefore, the word until as used in this section means up to, but 
not including the day of January 1, 2004. This day could not be included, as on this day 
the Covenants are automatically extended for another successive 10 year period; and this 
Court in Swenson I, similar to other courts, has ruled that once such an extension occurs, 
a majority vote cannot terminate or amend the Covenants until the end of the extension 
period. Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 815 (Utah 2000); City of Gulf Port v. Wilson, 
603 So.2d 295, 300 (Miss. 1992); Scholten v. Blackhawk Partners, 999 P.2d 393 
(Ariz.App. 1995); Failla v. Meaux 237 So.2d 688 (La.App. 1970); Wallace's Fourth 
Southmoor Addition, 874 P.2d 818, 821 (Okla.App. 1994). 
The court in Wallace's Fourth Southmoor Addition, supra, dealt with this 
same language and focused on the words "at which time" following the January 1st date. 
The court held that the phrase "at which time," in paragraph 10 refers to the January 1st 
date and time periods often years. The court further states that "this reference would be 
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meaningless if the covenants could be amended by a majority vote at any time on or after 
January 1, 1974." Id. at 821. Thus, the Covenants in this case, renewed on January 1st 
2004, and the majority vote to terminate the Covenants on January 1,2004 occurred after 
the Covenants were automatically renewed. 
Another case dealing with this issue is Failla v. Meaux, 237 So.2d. 688 
(La.App. 1970). In Failla v. Meaux the covenants were, "binding on the property until 
January 1, 1966, at which time the said restrictions shall be automatically extended for 
successive periods of 10 years without the necessity of any action whatsoever, unless by a 
vote of a majority of owners of the lots in said subdivision it is agreed to change, alter or 
discontinue any or all of said restrictions and covenants." In Fallia a majority of the 
owners by instrument dated and recorded on December 30, 1965 amended the covenants. 
This was challenged and the court ruled that the vote was effective, noting that had the 
owners waited until January 1, 1966 to amend the covenants, the covenants would already 
be renewed for another 10 years on that date and the amendment would not take effect 
until January 1,1976. 
Another case dealing with similar language is Mauldin v. Panella 17 P.3d 
837 (Colo.App. 2000) wherein the covenants recorded on August 2, 1962, were effective 
for 25 years until August 2, 1987, after which time said covenants shall be automatically 
extended for successive periods often years, unless an instrument signed by a majority of 
the then owners of all the lots in the subdivision has been recorded, agreeing to change 
13 
said covenants in whole or in part. On August 4, 1997 a instrument was recorded 
amending the covenants. This recording was too late. The court held that when on 
August 2, 1997, the renewal period began, without amendments to the covenants having 
previously been recorded, the original 1962 covenants were already automatically 
extended for an additional 10 years. Id. at 839. 
Other jurisdictions dealing with this issue and the same language as in this 
case, which is commonly contained in restrictive covenants, have held that once the 
renewal day begins without any vote for amendment or termination having taken place, 
the automatic renewal period begins and any vote taken after this time is not effective. 
Even the Defendants when they filed their Petition for Rehearing in the 
previous appeal, recognized this long line of cases; and argued that if they met and voted 
on January 1,2004, it would be too late, as the Covenants would already be automatically 
renewed for an additional 10 year period. (Rec. 84, 105-106).l 
The Covenants automatically renewed beginning January 1, 2004 at 12:01 
a.m., for another 10 years; therefore, the vote to terminate occurring on January 1, 2004, 
between noon and 2:00 p.m. is too late and is ineffective to terminate the Covenants. 
^his issue was never addressed as the Petition for Rehearing was not granted. 
Furthermore it did not help the Defendants at that time as the vote at issue before the 
Court on the last appeal occurred in 1997 not on January 1, 2004 
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B. This Court in Swenson I did not rule that a vote 
to terminate must take place on January 1, 2004-
This Court in Swenson I Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 815 (Utah 
2000) (Addendum, Ex. B hereto), did not rule that a vote to terminate the Covenants 
would have to take place on one day, that being January 1, 2004. The Court stated: 
Therefore, the owners have the power to amend the covenants, but only at 
such time as the covenants are due for extension. The last time was January 1, 
1994, we assume that the next such time will be on January 1,2004. (Addendum, 
Exhibit B,pg. 815) 
In Swenson /the Defendants by majority vote tried to terminate the 
Covenants on October 3, 1997. This Court recognized that the majority would not have 
the power to amend or terminate the Covenants, until the Covenants were due for 
extension, which would be on January 1, 2004. Thus, the date of January 1,2004 referred 
to by the Court, is not a date given for a majority vote, but rather the date that the 
Covenants were to be automatically extended. 
The language in Swenson I, "we assume that the next such time will be on 
January 1, 2004," is taken out of context by both the trial and appellate court. The 
sentence immediately preceding this language reads, "the owners have the power to 
amend the covenants, but only at such time as the covenants are due for extension." 
(emphasis added). Therefore, read in context the statement provides, "we assume that the 
next such time (the covenants are due for extension) will be on January 1, 2004. Again, 
this date relates only to the date of extension. There is no directive by this Court in 
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Swenson /that a majority vote to amend or terminate the Covenants must take place on 
January 1,2004.2 
Finally, the Court of Appeals states in paragraph 13 of its Opinion that, "the 
Utah Supreme Court held that the intent of the parties was that changes to the Covenants 
could only be made at the conclusion of those ten-year periods,..." (emphasis added). 
The American Heritage Dictionary defines "conclusion" as the "last part of something; or 
reaching the end of a formal agreement or deal." The Utah Supreme Court properly ruled 
that changes to the Covenants, by majority vote, could only be made at the conclusion of 
the ten year periods. However, the Utah Supreme Court did not state that the end of the 
day on January 1, 2004 would be the conclusion of the next ten year period. 
The drafters specifically prescribed January 1, 1994 as the beginning of the 
first ten year renewal period. (Restrictive Covenants, Addendum Ex. A, Section XIV). 
Therefore, the first ten year renewal period commenced on, and included January 1, 1994, 
and thus came to its conclusion at days end on December 31, 2003. The Opinion by the 
Utah Court of Appeals improperly extends the renewal period to ten years plus one day. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Swenson /affirmed the right of the majority owners to vote to 
terminate the Covenants, to take effect at the end of the ten year renewal period; but the 
vote to terminate the Covenants, to take effect at of the end of the renewal period, must 
2It is the well settled policy of the Utah Supreme Court to avoid giving advisory 
opinions in regards to issues which are unnecessary to resolve the claims before the 
Court. Savage v. Utah Youth Village, 104 P.3d 1242 (Utah 2004). 
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take place at a reasonable time prior to the start of the next renewal period. The Utah 
Supreme Court did not hold that the vote to terminate must occur on January 1, 2004, 
after the next ten year renewal period has already commenced. 
C. The ruling that the Covenants both automatically renewed and 
can be terminated by majority vote on the same day. January 1. 
2004, is inherently inconsistent. 
The Opinion rendered by the Utah Court of Appeals that the Covenants can 
be automatically renewed and terminated by majority vote on the same day, January 1, 
2004, is inherently inconsistent; and directly contrary to this Court's ruling in Swenson I 
that any attempt to amend or terminate the Covenants by majority vote once automatic 
renewal has occurred, will not be effective. 
As stated above, according to the unambiguous terms of the Covenants, 
they were automatically renewed for another 10 year period on January 1, 2004. 
Therefore any majority vote to terminate the Covenants would have to take place before 
January 1, 2004, when the next 10 year renewal period begins. City of Gulf Port v. 
Wilson, 603 So.2d 295, 300 (Miss. 1992); Scholten v. Blackhawk Partners, 999 P.2d 393 
(Ariz.App. 1995); Failla v. Meaux 237 So.2d 688 (La.App. 1970); Wallace's Fourth 
Southmoor Addition, 874 P.2d 818, 821 (Okla.App. 1994). 
Furthermore, if both the automatic renewal period and a majority vote to 
terminate the Covenants are allowed to take place on January 1,2004, as the Court of 
Appeals has opined, and there is no specific time set forth for either to take place, how 
17 
can the court determine which act is to take precedence? The automatic renewal of the 
Covenants or the majority vote to terminate? The Utah Court of Appeals in its Opinion 
states that the inclusion of only a date without a specific time suggests that the vote could 
be taken any time that day,3 but such reasoning would also apply to the start of the 
automatic renewal period. The Covenants do not provide that the renewal is to take place 
at 3:00 p.m4., 5:00 p.m., midnight, or any time after a vote has occurred How can the 
court find that the automatic renewal was not to occur until after the vote at 2:00 p.m. on 
January 1, 2004? Indeed, the drafters did not establish a specific time, or date, for a vote 
to take place. They did however, establish a date certain for the automatic renewal to 
commence, that being January 1st. The time of 12:01 a.m. is implied with this date.. By 
establishing such an automatic extension following a ten year period (ending at midnight 
3The reason there is no time set for the vote on January 1st, is that it was never 
intended that the vote would have to take place on this one day, but would occur prior to 
this renewal date, as the above cases have held. 
4The Covenants are renewed for a period often years and then automatically 
renewed for another ten years at the end of each ten year period. For the renewal period 
to be extended until 3:00 p.m or afterwards on January 1st, the Covenants would have to 
provide that they are not renewed for ten years, but for a period of 10 years, plus 15 
hours, etc... By simply specifying the ten year term, without any additional time on 
January 1st for a vote to be taken, the drafters obviously intended that the Covenants 
would be renewed at the stroke of 12:01 a.m. on January 1st, the beginning of a new year 
and a new ten year period. 
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on December 31st) the renewal would automatically become effective at the beginning of 
January 1st, that is at 12:01 a.m., with the new ten year renewal period.5 
Moreover, since the automatic renewal does not require any specific act to 
take place, but the voting does, if both can occur on January 1st 2004, the conditions for 
the automatic renewal would be met first; and therefore, it would occur and take effect 
before any vote could take place later that day.6 
D. The interpretation that this Court ruled in Swenson I that the 
vote must take place on January 1, 2004. is too limiting. 
Taking the interpretation applied by the trial court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals to this Court's ruling in Swenson I, that the only time that the majority can vote 
to amend or terminate the Covenants is on January 1, 2004, would limit the time for the 
majority owners to vote, to either amend or terminate the Covenants, to one single day. 
It is improbable that the drafters intended to specify this one single day, 
January 1st for such a vote to take place. It is a far more reasonable intent that the "then 
owners" be able to vote within a reasonably short period of time before the automatic 
renewal date of January 1st. See City of Gulf Port v. Wilson, 603 So.2d 295 (Miss. 1992) 
5By ruling that the vote to terminate the Covenants can take place any time during 
the day on January 1, 2004; the Court of Appeals is in effect rewriting the terms of the 
Covenants changing the automatic renewal date from January 1st to January 2nd. This 
ruling is contrary to the express terms of the Covenants and fails to enforce the Covenants 
as clearly written. 
6Of course this situation is avoided with the proper interpretation of the Covenants 
that the vote must take place before the automatic renewal date of January 1st 2004. 
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wherein the court held that where a restrictive covenant was automatically extended for 
successive periods often years, and is silent as to when the vote must take place, it was 
reasonable for the amendment to be voted on before the expiration of the term so that the 
covenant would not automatically renew for another ten years.7 
The Utah Court of Appeals while concerned about the drafters not including 
a specific time on January 1st when the automatic extension is to take effect, apparently 
has no problem in rewriting the Covenants to limit the period for voting on the Covenants 
to one single day, that being January 1st. This is done although the Covenants fail to 
identify any specific date for such a vote to occur. 
The better law and interpretation given to such language, as other courts 
have done, is that the vote to amend or terminate the covenants should occur within a 
reasonably short period of time before the expiration date of the term, so that it is an 
accurate vote of the "then owners" and so that the covenants do not automatically renew 
for another 10 year period. City of Gulf Port v. Wilson, 603 So.2d 295, 300 (Miss. 1992) 
The voters in this case could have met several weeks before the January 1, 
2004 renewal date, and voted to terminate the Covenants. Of course consistent with this 
7The court further stated that if the amendment was not already voted on and 
ratified to go into effect on January 1, 1985, then the old covenant would automatically 
renew on that date and go into effect for another 10 years. Id. at 300. 
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Court's ruling in Swenson I, such termination, by majority vote, would not take effect 
until at the end of the current 10 year period; however, this was never done.8 
E. It is not necessary for the Covenants to designate the exact time 
of 12:01 a.m. on January 1. 2004, for automatic renewal. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in its ruling states that the inclusion of only a 
date for renewal without a specific time suggests that the vote to terminate could be taken 
anytime that day. The Court of Appeals states, "If the drafters intended to impose a strict 
12:01 a.m., deadline, the Covenants could have said so." However, such an imposition 
would be redundant, and is not necessary or practical, since it is undisputed and known to 
everyone, that January 1st would start at 12:01 a.m. The time of 12:01 a.m. would 
therefore be implicit with the date of January 1st., and it would not be reasonable for the 
drafters of the Covenants to set forth the exact time of 12:01 a.m. for the Covenants to be 
renewed. Furthermore, if the drafters intended that the Covenants not be renewed until 
after 2:00 p.m. on January 1, 2004, as the Court of Appeals holds, then they would have 
explicitly provided for a time of 2:00 p.m. in the Covenants. 
Since there is no time specified for the renewal of the Covenants, it is 
improper for the Utah Court of Appeals to just assume that the renewal time must be 
some time after 2:00 p.m., when the vote concluded in this case. This interpretation is 
8It must not be forgotten that one of the vested rights of an owner of real property, 
subject to restrictive covenants, is the method required to amend, change or abolish the 
restrictive covenants. In re Wallace's Fourth Southmoor Addition, 874 P.2d 818, 821 
(OkLApp. 1994). 
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more strained than the 12:01 a.m. deadline implicit with the date. Indeed, the cases have 
held that when there is no exact time specified for the renewal of restrictive covenants on 
a certain date, the renewal takes place at the beginning of the day; and a vote taken later 
that day is too late and is ineffective to amend or terminate the covenants. City of Gulf 
Port v. Wilson, 603 So.2d 295, 300 (Miss. 1992); Scholten v. BlackhawkPartners, 999 
P.2d 393 (Ariz.App. 1995); Failla v. Meaux 237 So.2d 688 (La.App. 1970); Wallace's 
Fourth Southmoor Addition, 874 P.2d 818, 821 (Okla.App. 1994). 
CONCLUSION 
The Restrictive Covenants were automatically renewed for another 10 year 
period on January 1, 2004 at 12:01 a.m., and therefore, any vote taken on January 1, 2004 
after the Covenants were renewed is of no effect. 
This Court in Swenson /held that the majority did not have the power to 
terminate the Covenants until they were due for extension on January 1, 2004. This Court 
did not rule that the vote to terminate the Covenants must take place on January 1, 2004. 
The ruling by the Utah Court of Appeals that the Covenants can be both 
automatically renewed and terminated by majority vote on January 1, 2004, is inherently 
inconsistent and contrary to this Court's ruling in Swenson L 
Based on the forgoing the Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals should be 
reversed and the Notice of Termination filed on March 26, 2004, based on the alleged 
majority vote on January 1, 2004, should be declared null and void. 
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DATED this Z ^ d a y of June, 2006. 
BOND & CALL, L.C. 
&Q' L^dt^OC j> 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, first class, 
TWO true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF PETITIONERS this 2 .0 
day of June, 2006, to: 
J. Thomas Bowen 
935 East South Union Avenue, Suite D102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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KIBTON U*NDANX> INVESTMENT CORPORATION, * corpora-
iiOQ of Utah, with Ha principal pkcc of bvmiaeBS in Salt Lake Ctty, Salt 
1-a.fcc County, State of Utah, aad HAROLD M. CAMPBZLL aod MA R3T 
CAMPBELL, hie vile, the owner* of the following described real prop-
erty actuated In Salt Lake County, Slate of Utah, to-"wil: 
Lots 1 through 52, QUAIL POINT SUB-
DIVISION, a subdivision of Salt LaJce 
County, State of Utah, according to the 
official plat thereof on file and of record 
In the office of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder; 
does hereby pUce the hereinafter designated restriction covenants upon 
ail of the lour of Bs.Ld subdivision. 
Lota 1 through 52 shall be known a* "residential lots." J&x 
ftrgctare ghall he erected, altered, pkcedor permitted to rcoam on 
*
ny_rcsidential i o t " l ^ WiI7~d>elUng, a, 
^tiogara£e, a. guest hoosl ancf out build IRVB for rx-t* a* h ^ l n . L ^ ^OXa ^ *_ B^ ^J ings  pet   hereina/ter" 
described. "~ • —•— • — 
- ^ No residential structure, nor any part thereof shall bc erected 
Altered, placed or permitted to remain on anj parcel of land containing 
ieaa than an entire residential lot (unless- *ald parcel ahaJU have a vldth 
of at least 105 feel al the front bnilding set b*clc line*. 
- * No button* shall be erected, pkeed, or altered on ary premises 
m a»M development until the bulldln* pUw, npec.flc^lonfi. md plo. p W 
n m g l o c a l I o n °'*"ch building have b«eu approved u to conformity 
and Harmony of external design with existing structure in the dcvclop-
flS J ** !f 1fC a t i°n °* t h c b u i l d i ^ ^ t b aspect to topography *nd 
"£U.tie,d ground e l e v e n by an BJrcJtuUctur*! committee co»pOBCd Df 
LUARLES R_ KDEtTON u.d o t W member selected by Wjtn or by a repre 
-*rvtetlve d^ignated by tbo member-, of .«W commits*. £a the r v c « o f 
: Z l ° r r C ' i £ l U t t l ° n * ^ "wmber. of «Id committee, the remaining 
" S o r i T v V S °Catl°tt' ° r *° d « 1 « a « « « representative ^
 l l J t e
W 
-v^tl , ! ^ ^ ^ t h c m o t n b «™ °* « " committee die
 o r l n thc 
* ° e n t l ^ * u b d i , v l i ' l O T * h ^ h^« tbe right to elect a commute*. In * 
or dla!^, C D m^tt««. or lt» d e l a t e d KpreaeaUlIn ftfl, to aPpror« 
r«qul«d r ! / £ r ««PJ»tIoa thereor. nuch approval vtU not be 
Tlth. Neither the members of such auiuLLiJULLL H J I iiu Utumated 
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r e p r e s e n t a t i v e shall be entitled to ariy compensat ion for aervicee p e r f o r m e d 
purBonnt to this corencant. This commit tee sha l l have the right to wry the 
r e q u i r e m e n t s BJ? set forth JD Section IT, but sa id va r i ance shall not be valid 
u n l e s s obtained in writ ing. 
n 
IBcory detached single .family duel l ing e rec ted on any one of the 
fiJbove-described rc*ldenti$d. lotc BhxH have a rmoimuco a r e * above the 
ground o£ 1,250 j&qa&re feet, exclauiva of ga rages and open porchea. No 
two— jstory s t r u c t u r e s uhall be built on any lot without t he eocpreEs cone eat 
of The u r ch i t ec tu ra l committee- Said consent shal l be granted only -where 
it 1B d e e m e d by ihe architect oral corruaaittee that the second story sha l l not 
a d v e r s e l y affect the vie-v of the city o r moimt&JnB from the other lotfi-
III 
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M 
N o outbuilding «hell be erected., a l t e r e d , p laced or perrijltted 
to r e o i i n n e a r e r than eight (B) feet to e i the r s ide line of A lot unless TXO 
p o r t i o n of sa id building extends neE.rer to the s t r e e t l ine than eb^y-flve (S3) 
l e e t -
* 
T h e min imum -clae ^srd far any dwelling" a ba l l be eight (S) feet-
IV 
No res iden t ia l fitrccicre shall be e r e c t e d o r placed on ajy building 
site,, -which h&e aa a r e a oi less then 8,000 s q u a r e feet-
* N o noxious o r offensive t rade o r ac t iv i ty gftfl.ll be carried on ttpoa 
Any bu i ld ing s i t e i>or shall anything be done t h e r e o n which may be o r b e -
c o m e an -Rraxyyance o r nnlsaxice to the ne ighborhood. 
VI 
No t na i ler , baeeroent, tent, shaclc, g&riLgc> ba.rn o r other o u t -
bu i ld ing e r e c t e d on a building 6vie c o v e r e d by theec covenante snail at sjny 
t ime be txned for human habitation t e m p o r a r i l y o r pe rmanen t ly , o&r erhall 
Any S t r u c t u r e of a t e m p o r a r y ch»r«Arut.^3r b e u s e d f o r hupa* n habttrxKon-
vn 
Ka^erncnta ar«> reserved RE ebo'wn on tho r o c o r d e d pl»t Inr nrilitjr 
loHtGLllAtioo^ p ipel ines , diteheB, and* toualatojJBa>oc. Nothing LU this p a r a -
g r a p h conta ined •ba l l be interpreted AS proh ib i t ing cornet ruction of -walk*,. 
drlrcrw^yB, porches, e t c . , over *n_ch case rn c a t s , aab jec t to the rights at 
t h o s e Trith cafitorncnte to male* Tvac*»flary r e p a i r s «Ltjd condact n*cee aary 
m*ttrt'«-oja_.n.Oo a toog- «ucJK oiL*<Dn>c:n.t». 
VDOC 
N o a n i m a l * o r pou l t ry of a n y kJLrud o t h e r t h a n hou£N> p c t » *H«*UI b o tept 
OTC truant*, load on any part of said p r o p e r t y . 
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IX 
~*-A
 n la . ced or a l t e r e d on anj lot 
N o f e o c e o r w a l l shall b e e r t c t e d , p *
 fiett>ack U l , e -without 
nearer to *ny Bt«et than tb* minimum building setbac 
approval as hereinafter set forth. 
- - rtn f^ t^- In height flha1! be 
No fence, *alls, or hedge over six W ieet ^ 5 however, that 
erected or grown at any place on said premise - P
 o r 'a u l l l f l cd by 
the restriction aet forth in lUa *«tion raay be vr*
 t h w l fifty (50) 
cogent of architectural committee or by t h e ^ ° ^ b t D a t > e d m waUnj. 
percent of the numbered lots within ttuB .abdWlslon ot»to 
X 
KO structure «**! be moved on to any " - ^ J ^ ^ f J 1 1 0 
hereinbefore described or any P ^ T I r ,h fee I ^holder* of other lot. 
approrai of ooe hundred percent (100%) of the ?« ^ Jf * 
inWs subdivision, such approval to be *,v«a m^K.**. 
XI 
„o . * a of ,Dy kind **H * d i ^ y e d ^ £ * * £ , ? , £ 
lot except ooe profession*! .l«a o not ^ " . ^ ^ L ^ p e r l y *r « 1 . 
Bi^ n of not more than five sjnare feet, advertls ng °*. ^ J " ^ , . ; ^ «„_ 
or rent, or signs uaCd by builder to adver t s tb= property 
struetiOD and aal-es period. 
xn 
of any idnd, or quancytog *U1 not be permuted apoo or » « 7 o ^ 
bnlMfa* stte» In the true, deecr,bed herein^nor *haU oU J l . ^ 
tunnels, mineral excavBtlow or shafts be permitted upon or 
bu&dlcig- s i t e s c o v e r e d by theee c o v e n a n t s . 
XUI 
material ehall be kept u> a dean sod aanitary conditio-
XIV 
These c o v e r t . .re to r.o with the W and shaU bo b « W on 
all parties aud all
 Pcr,one claiming under them «alll January 1 ^ at 
which time .aid covenant, ahull be automatically f " ^ f ' ° / J ^ f " ^ 
period* of 10 yoara unlca. by vote of a majority of tfc« theo o*n.r. o<. «« 
bSwm* eilcs covered by these covenant* U I. **r«cd to changeaald cove 
rants in whDlo or part. 
- ^ f c If th« paurtlcB hereto,
 M y of them, or their h*Ir«. « ^ ™ ' 
JysxM trJLol^tc or- At tempt to vLol*.lc -jcry of the coverx^td h e r e i n it PO*XL 
be UirfQl for *ny other pcroon or pcrfiona o^mW *^y r*>a P ^ c r t * 
*itaatcd In *ald tract, to prosecute any proceeding *t la^ o- tn cq y 
KAtJCi w+ 
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CORPORATION auu
 4J_ 
V7\fc. ha^e hereunto se t their "haads and official s e a l t b l t 
J u l y 1973 ^ T O N X ^ N D AND INVESTMENT 
K I R T
 C O R P O B A T I O ^ 
S T A T E OF-UTAH 1 ^ 
County of Salt L»** )
 a p p « r f d before n^c 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
SWENSON v. ERICKSON Utah 807 
Cite as 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000) 
2000 UT 16 was in effect grant of summary judgment in 
David and Barbara SWENSON, f a v o r o f movant. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 12(b)(6), 56. 
David V. ERICKSON, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 980075. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 19, 2000. 
Rehearing Denied March 29, 2000. 
Neighbors brought action to enjoin 
property owner's construction of building and 
to compel him to remove portion of building 
already constructed, alleging that such con-
struction violated subdivision's restrictive 
covenants. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake Department, Anne M. Stirba, J., grant-
ed temporary restraining order and prelimi-
nary injunction, and subsequently found that 
building did not violate covenants and dis-
missed neighbors' compliant. Neighbors ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Howe, C.J., held 
that: (1) restrictive covenant limiting permis-
sible stinctures to single family homes, guest 
houses, garages, and outbuildings for pets, 
expressly prohibited construction of building 
erected by property owner; (2) erection of 
small storage sheds by 19 of 52 property 
owners in subdivision in violation of covenant 
did not result in abandonment of covenant; 
(3) approval of building by subdivision's ar-
chitectural committee did not relieve owner 
of obligation to comply with covenant; and (4) 
petition circulated by property owner and 
signed by majority of subdivision residents 
did not terminate subdivision's restrictive 
covenants. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Stewart, J., concurred in the result. 
*• Judgment e=>183, 186 
Where trial court and parties relied ex-
tensively on materials beyond allegations of 
c
°toplaint in proceeding on motion to dismiss 
tor failure to state a claim, that motion was 
Implicitly converted to motion for summary 
Judgment, and grant of motion to dismiss 
2. Appeal and Error <3=>863, 934(1) 
On review of a summary judgment mo-
tion, the Supreme Court considers the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, and will affirm only where 
it appears that there is no genuine dispute as 
to any material issues of fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56. 
3. Covenants ^69(1) 
Restrictive covenants that run with the 
land and encumber subdivision lots form a 
contract between subdivision property own-
ers as a whole and individual lot owners; 
therefore, interpretation of the covenants is 
governed by the same rules of construction 
as those used to interpret contracts. 
4. Covenants <S=^49 
Generally, unambiguous restrictive cov-
enants should be enforced as written; 
however, where restrictive covenants are 
susceptible to two or more reasonable in-
terpretations, the intention of the parties 
is controlling. 
5. Covenants <5=>49 
The intention of the parties to a restric-
tive covenant is ascertained from the docu-
ment itself and the language used within the 
document. 
6. Covenants e=>69(2) 
Subdivision's restrictive covenant which 
limited permissible structures to single fami-
ly homes, guest houses, garages, and out-
buildings for pets, expressly prohibited con-
struction of building erected by property 
owner for use as wood shop and for storage. 
7. Appeal and Error <3>S42(8) 
The trial court's interpretation of the 
language of a restrictive covenant, absent 
resort to extrinsic evidence, presents a ques-
tion of law which the Supreme Court reviews 
for correctness. 
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8. Covenants <3=>69(2) 
Even if subdivision's restrictive covenant 
barring human occupation of any "trailer, 
basement, tent, shack, garage [or] barn" ex-
panded list of permissible structures beyond 
those enumerated in covenant limiting such 
structures to single family homes, guest 
houses, garages, and outbuildings for pets, 
building erected by subdivision resident for 
use as wood shop and for storage did not fall 
within any description of pei'missible struc-
tures contained in either covenant. 
9. Covenants e=>49 
Under the well-established rule of con-
struction ejusdem generis, general language 
must be confined to its meaning by specific 
enumeration which proceeds it, unless a con-
trary intention is shown. 
10. Covenants <£=>49 
It is the Supreme Court's duty to en-
force the intentions of covenanting parties as 
expressed in the plain language of the cove-
nants. 
11. Covenants <s=>77.1 
Property owners who purchase land in 
developments subject to restrictive covenants 
have a right to enforce such covenants 
against other owners who violate them. 
12. Covenants <5=>72.1 
Conduct by property owners within a 
development may terminate and render un-
enforceable a particular restrictive covenant, 
where such conduct so substantially changes 
the character of the neighborhood as to neu-
tralize the benefit of the covenant, or consti-
tutes evidence of the abandonment of the 
covenant. 
13. Covenants e=>72.1 
Abandonment of a restrictive covenant 
may be found where there has been substan-
tial and general noncompliance with the cove-
nant. 
14. Covenants <3=>72.1 
In order to constitute abandonment of a 
restrictive covenant, the violations of the cov-
enant must be so substantial as to destroy its 
usefulness and support a finding that the 
covenant has become burdensome. 
15. Covenants 3>72.1 
If the original purpose of a restrictive 
covenant can still be accomplished despite 
violations, and substantial benefit will contin-
ue to inure to residents, the covenant win 
stand. 
16. Covenants <s=>122 
Evidence of abandonment of a restric-
tive covenant must be established by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
17. Covenants ^72.1 
No abandonment of a restrictive cove-
nant will be found where violations are of a 
minor nature and do not destroy the general 
building scheme, if the violations are slight, 
unimportant, and unsubstantial, or if the vio-
lations are inoffensive. 
18. Covenants <s=>72.1 
In determining whether violations of a 
particular restrictive covenant have resulted 
in its abandonment, the court must examine: 
(1) the number, nature and severity of the 
then existing violations; (2) any prior act of 
enforcement of the restriction; and (3) wheth-
er it is still possible to realize to a substantial 
degree the benefits intended through the 
covenant. 
19. Covenants <3=>72.1 
Erection of small storage sheds by 19 of 
52 property owners in subdivision, in viola-
tion of restiictive covenant limiting permissi-
ble structures to single family homes, guest 
houses, garages, and outbuildings for pets 
did not result in abandonment of covenant, 
where storage sheds had average size of 
eight by ten feet and were approximately 
seven and one-half feet in height, were not 
placed on permanent foundations, were not 
inhabited, and typically fit unobtrusively in 
back corner of lot. 
20. Covenants <^72.1 
Approval by subdivision's architectural 
committee of building erected by property 
owner for use as wood shop and for storage 
did not relieve owner of obligation to comply 
with restrictive covenant limiting permissible 
structures to single family homes, guest 
houses, garages, and outbuildings for pets. 
21. Covenants <5=>73 
Petition circulated by property owner 
and signed by majority of subdivision resi-
dents, which attempted to terminate subdivi-
sion's restrictive covenants, was ineffective 
for that purpose, where covenants specifically 
provided that they would be terminated by 
majority vote of subdivision property owners 
only at specific ten-year intervals. 
Budge W. Call, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiffs. 
J. Thomas Bowen, Midvale, for defendant. 
HOWE, Chief Justice: 
111 Plaintiffs David and Barbara Swenson 
appeal from the trial court's dissolution of 
their preliminary injunction against defen-
dant David Erickson and the dismissal of 
their complaint against him. The court ruled 
that the woodworking shop that Erickson 
constructed did not violate the restrictive 
covenants governing the subdivision in which 
Erickson and the Swensons live, and that the 
Swensons' claims became moot after the rep-
resentative of an architectural committee ap-
proved Erickson's structure. 
BACKGROUND 
11 2 The Swensons and Erickson own ad-
joining lots in Quail Point Subdivision in Salt 
Lake County. Quail Point lots are subject to 
restrictive covenants recorded in July 1973. 
In July or August 1997, Erickson commenced 
the construction of a building on his lot that 
he intended to use as a woodworking shop 
and private storage facility. The structure is 
approximately 288 to 384 square feet and 12 
feet high. Erickson did not obtain preappro-
val from the subdivision's architectural com-
mittee for this structure, as required by the 
restrictive covenants.1 However, the com-
mittee had not functioned for the previous 
twentv-three vears, if it ever functioned at 
all. 
1- Under article I of the covenants, no structure 
ma\ be-
erected, placed or altered on any premises in 
[Quail Point] until the building plans, specifica-
tions, and plot plans showing the location of 
such building have been approved as to con-
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H 3 In July 1997, having notified Erickson 
that the structure would violate the restric-
tive covenants, and having given him written 
notice of their intent to legally oppose the 
building, the Swensons brought this action to 
enjoin Erickson's construction and to compel 
him to remove the building. Erickson, how-
ever, proceeded, completing much of the 
structure by mid-August. 
11 4 In August 1997, the trial court issued a 
temporary restraining order and, in Septem-
ber, granted the Swensons a preliminary in-
junction precluding Erickson from further 
work on or in the structure. After the pre-
liminary injunction issued, two of the origi-
nal appointed members of the architectural 
committee, Mary Campbell and Charles R. 
Kirton, designated Robert Campbell as the 
sole representative of the committee. 
Campbell then formally approved Erickson's 
structure as to its external design, location, 
and finished ground elevation. Campbell 
also circulated a petition among Quail Point 
homeowners to terminate the restrictive cov-
enants. Owners of thirty-eight of the fifty-
two Quail Point lots signed the petition. 
Campbell then recorded a notice of termi-
nation of the restrictive covenants with the 
Salt Lake County recorder. 
115 Erickson next moved pursuant to Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss 
the Swensons' complaint and dissolve the 
temporary restraining order, asserting that 
the termination of the covenants rendered 
the Swensons' complaint for breach of the 
covenants moot. The Swensons in turn 
moved to nullify the notice of termination. 
The trial court granted Erickson's motion 
and set aside the preliminary injunction after 
concluding that the covenants did not prohib-
it Erickson's workshop, and that Campbell's 
appi*oval of the workshop subsequent to the 
preliminary injunction rendered the Swen-
sons' claims moot. 
Article I of the covenants provides in part: 
No structure shall be erected, altered, 
placed or permitted to remain on any ''res-
idential lot" other than one detached single 
lormity and harmony of external design with 
existing structures in the development, and as 
to location of the budding with respect to to-
pography and finished ground elevation b\ an 
architectural committee 
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family dwelling, a private garage, a guest 
house, and outbuildings for pets as herein-
after described.... 
With respect to setback requirements for 
outbuildings, article III requires: 
No outbuilding shall be erected, altered, 
placed or pennitted to remain nearer than 
eight (8) feet to either side line of a lot 
unless no portion of said building extends 
nearer to the street line than sixty-five (66) 
feet. 
Finally, article VI prohibits the use of certain 
structures for human habitation on Quail 
Point lots: 
No trailer, basement, tent, shack, garage, 
barn or other outbuilding erected on a 
building site covered by these covenants 
shall at any time be used for human habi-
tation temporarily or permanently, nor 
shall any structure of a temporary charac-
ter be used for human habitation. 
116 By 1997, before Erickson built his 
structure, there had been erected on approxi-
mately nineteen of fifty-two Quail Point lots 
small storage-type sheds and other similar 
structures that did not qualify as single-fami-
ly dwellings, private garages, guest houses, 
or outbuildings for pets. 
117 The Swensons appeal, contending that 
(1) the restrictive covenants prohibit the 
erection of Erickson's workshop; (2) Robert 
Campbell, the representative of the architec-
tural committee, did not have the authority 
to relieve Erickson of complying with the 
covenants; (3) if Campbell or the committee 
had that authority, Erickson did not obtain 
preapproval from him or the committee to 
erect the workshop as required by the cove-
nants; and (4) the notice of termination is 
invalid and cannot immediately terminate the 
covenants. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] 118 This case comes to this court fol-
lowing the trial court's grant of a rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in favor of Erick-
son. However, in granting the 12(b)(6) mo-
tion, the trial court and the parties relied 
extensively on materials beyond the allega-
tions of the complaint. Where outside mat-
ters are "presented to and not excluded by 
the court, the motion shall be treated as one 
for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be 
given reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by 
Rule 56." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). 
11 9 In their briefs and at oral arguments to 
this court, both parties again rely extensively 
on evidence from the preliminary hearing, 
affidavits, and supporting documents. Be-
cause from the outset the parties have sub-
mitted extraneous materials and treated the 
motion to dismiss as a motion for summary 
judgment, neither party was prejudiced or 
unfairly surprised by the trial court's implicit 
conversion of Erickson's 12(b)(6) motion into 
a motion for summary judgment. See DOIT, 
Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 
838-39 n. 3 (Utah 1996) (citing World Peace 
Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency 
Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 256 n. 2 (Utah 1994); 
Warren v. Provo City Corp,, 838 P.2d 1125, 
1127 n. 2 (Utah 1992); Johnson v. Motion 
Thiokol Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1991)). 
Therefore, we treat the trial court's order as 
a summary judgment for Erickson. 
[2] 1110 On review of a summary judg-
ment motion, we consider the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party 
and affirm only where it appears that there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material 
issues of fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. See Thayne 
v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 
(Utah 1994) (citing Themy v. Seagull Enters. 
Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 1979)). We 
review the trial court's legal determinations 
for correctness. See Geisdorf v. Doughty, 
972 P.2d 67, 69-70 (Utah 1998). 
ANALYSIS 
I. STRUCTURES PROHIBITED 
UNDER THE RESTRICTIVE 
COVENANTS 
[3-6] 1111 We first address whether 
Quail Point's restrictive covenants prohibit 
the erection of Erickson's workshop. Re" 
strictive covenants that run with the land and 
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ncumber subdivision lots form a contract 
etween subdivision property owners as a 
•hole and individual lot owners; therefore, 
iterpretation of the covenants is governed 
y the same rules of construction as those 
sed to interpret contracts. See Smith Shore 
lomes Ass'n v. Holland Holiday's, 219 Kan. 
14, 549 P.2d 1035, 1042 (1976); Gosnay v. 
ig Sky Owners Ass'n, 205 Mont. 221, 666 
.2d 1247, 1250 (1983); Tompkins v. Butt-
m Constr. Co. of Nev., 99 Nev. 142, 659 
.2d 865, 866 (1983); 9 Richard R. Powell, 
oivell on Real Property § 60.05, at 60-82 
>atrick J. Rohan ed., 1998); 20 Am.Jur.2d 
ovenants § 170, at 591 (1995). Generally, 
lambiguous restrictive covenants should be 
lforced as written. However, where re-
rictive covenants are susceptible to two or 
ore reasonable interpretations, the inten-
)n of the parties is controlling. See Powell, 
ipra, § 60.05, at 60-82. The intention of 
e parties is ascertained from the document 
self and the language used within the docu-
ent. See Buehner Block Co. v. UWC As-
c, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988); Powell, 
pro, § 60.05, at 60-82. 
[7] H 12 Article I of the covenants pro-
les in relevant part, "No structure shall be 
,ered, placed or permitted to remain on any 
ksidential lot' other than one detached sin-
> family dwelling, a private garage, a guest 
use, and outbuildings for pets as hereinaf-
- described." The parties do not dispute 
*t Erickson's workshop does not fit neatly 
thin those four types of structures. The 
nfusion surrounding what structures may 
erected arises from language contained in 
ler articles of the covenants. Specifically, 
:icle VI requires that "[n]o trailer, base-
st, tent, shack, garage, barn or other out-
ilding erected on a building site covered by 
?se covenants shall at any time be used for 
man habitation temporarily or permanent-
nor shall any structure of a temporary 
iracter be used for human habitation." 
tide III addresses outbuildings further, 
luiring that "[n]o outbuilding shall be 
kcted, altered, placed or permitted to re-
in nearer than eight (8) feet to either side 
2 of a lot unless no portion of said building 
ends nearer to the street line than sixty-
5 (65) feet.'' On the basis of its reading of 
icles VI and III, and in an effort to give 
. ERICKSON Utah 811 
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effect to the covenants as a whole, the trial 
court held that, as a matter of law, the 
covenants do not prohibit the building of 
Erickson's workshop. The court reasoned 
that the term "outbuildings for pets" in arti-
cle I "is not limited to those buildings that 
only house pets, but, rather, the term in-
cludes trailers, tents, shacks, garages, barns, 
and the like." The trial court's interpreta-
tion of the language of a restrictive covenant, 
absent resort to extrinsic evidence, presents 
a question of law which we review for cor-
rectness. See, e.g., Buehner, 752 P.2d at 895. 
1113 The Swensons contend that article I 
specifically limits what structures may be 
built in Quail Point. Article VI, although 
referring to other buildings, specifically pro-
hibits human habitation and does not expand 
the types of structures permitted under arti-
cle I. Therefore, the Swensons argue, specific 
limitations in article I prescribing the struc-
tures Quail Point owners may build should 
prevail over the general language of article 
VI prohibiting the use of certain structures 
for human habitation. Erickson contends 
that if only the four types of structures in 
article I are permitted, the terms used in 
article VI (i.e., trailer, tent, shack, barn, or 
other outbuilding) are rendered superfluous. 
He also argues that the use of the term 
"outbuilding" in article III and its concern 
that outbuildings not be located within eight 
feet of a lot's side line unless they are sixty-
five feet from the street implicitly suggests 
that the drafters of the covenants intended to 
allow outbuildings other than for pets, such 
as sheds, barns, and workshops. 
[8] 1114 A plain reading of articles I and 
VI reveals two distinct purposes. Article Fs 
primary purpose is to limit the types of 
structures permitted on a residential lot in 
Quail Point. On this point, article I is clear 
and unambiguous; Quail Point homeowners 
may erect four permanent structures on their 
lots: (1) a single family dwelling; (2) a pri-
vate garage; (3) a guest house; and (4) 
outbuildings for pets. Article VFs primary 
purpose is to prohibit human habitation of 
any structures other than a main dwelling or 
a guest house, as permitted by article I. 
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1115 Close scrutiny of the language in arti-
cle VI, however, diminishes the apparent in-
consistency between article I and article VI 
Ube of the term "building site" instead of 
"residential lot" in article VI suggests that 
the drafters weie concerned with preventing 
either builders or futuie homeowners from 
living in partially completed buildings (eg, 
basements, garages, shacks, barns, or other 
outbuildings) or movable structures (eg, 
trailers or tents) during prolonged construc-
tion on a residential lot or othei unforeseen 
delay, or with preventing homeowners from 
changing the single-family residential charac-
ter of the subdivision by having persons oc-
cupy buildings other than the main dwelling 
or guest house The fact that article VI lists 
three permanent structures (l e, shacks, 
barns, or other outbuildings) not otherwise 
allowed under article I is not determinative, 
as the overriding intent of article VI is to 
prevent human habitation of additional struc-
tures 
[9] 1116 It is also evident from the lan-
guage of the covenants that Enckson's woik-
shop does not fit neatly within the common 
and ordinary meaning of "trailer, basement, 
tent, shack, garage [or] barn" contained in 
article VI Accordingly, even assuming that 
article VI expands the allowable structures 
under the covenants, the only term that could 
be read to allow the erection of Enckson's 
woi kshop is "other outbuildings " 2 It is not 
this court's practice to override specific lan-
guage with general provisions dealing with 
wholly distinct subject matter Under the 
well-established rule of construction ejusdem 
generis, general language must be confined 
to its meaning by specific enumeration which 
pioceeds it, unless a contrary intention is 
shown See Pamsh v Richards, 8 Utah 2d 
419, 421-22, 336 P.2d 122, 123 (1959), Edwin 
Q Patterson, The Interpretation and Con-
struction of Contracts, 64 Colum L Rev 
S33, 853 (1964) Here, no contrary intention 
ib shown by any language of the covenants, 
and allowing the expansive reading put forth 
by Enckson would render the clear and ex-
plicit limitation in article I meaningless The 
effect of Enckson's position would be to ev 
2 Generally an outbuilding is something which 
is to be used in connection with a main building 
pand the four explicit allowable structures in 
article I to an infinite number of structures 
that could be said to qualify as "other out-
buildings" under article VI The drafteis 
could not have intended such a result 
K 17 Finally, Enckson argues that because 
article III lequires that no outbuilding be 
erected nearer than eight feet to either side 
line of a lot unless no portion of the building 
is within sixty-five feet of the street line 
suggests that Enckson's workshop is permis-
sible under the covenants According to Er-
lckson, "[I]t is ludicrous to believe that the 
drafters of the covenants were concerned 
that a dog house might be located nearer to 
the street than 65 feet" 
1118 Enckson's mtei pretation of article III 
is untenable First, article III does not con-
tradict the explicit limitations in article I on 
those structures that Quail Point lot owners 
may build Article I allows a single family 
dwelling, a guest house, a pnvate garage, 
and outbuildings for pets, and in no way 
contradicts article Ill's requirement that 
these outbuildings be erected no closer than 
eight feet fi om either side line of a lot unless 
they are sixty-five feet from the street line 
Second, article III does not prohibit the loca-
tion of outbuildings within sixty-five feet of 
the street line, as Enckson suggests An 
outbuilding must be at least sixty-five feet 
from the street line only if it is within eight 
feetofthe side line of the lot 
MIO] /U 19 Finally, it is not for this court to 
aiecopd-guess the judgment of covenanting 
parties by including setback requirements for 
particular structures It is this court's duty 
to enforce the intentions of the parties as 
expressed m the plain language of the cove-
nants See Freeman v Gee, 18 Utah 2d 339, 
345, 423 P2d 155, 159 (1967) The most 
reasonable interpretation of the Quail Point 
covenants is that they expressly prohibit the 
erection of Enckson's building because it is 
not a single family dwelling, a guest house, a 
pnvate garage, or an outbuilding for pets 
II ABANDONMENT OF RESTRICTIVE 
COVENANTS 
H 20 Enckson contends that even if article 
I prohibits his structure, that covenant has 
or which is subservient to it although distinct 
theiefrom 20 Am Jur 2d Covenants § 181 
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been abandoned by Quail Point owners. We 
therefore address whether Quail Point lot 
owners have abandoned the restrictions, as 
evidenced by their construction of numerous 
other structures, mainly small storage-type 
sheds and other similar structures, since re-
cordingJJi^ covenants in 1973. 
1121 Restrictive covenants are a 
rfmon method of effectuating private resi-
dential developmental schemes. See Powell, 
supra, § 60.06[3], at 60-104 to 60-112. 
Property owners who purchase land in such 
developments have a right to enforce such 
covenants against other owners who violate 
them. See Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 
478, 480-81 (Utah 1981); Powell, supra, 
§ 60.07[c], at 60-121. Conduct by property 
owners within a development, however, may 
terminate and render unenforceable a partic-
ular covenant where such conduct so sub-
stantially changes the character of the neigh-
borhood as to neutralize the benefit of the 
covenant, see Crimmins, 636 P.2d at 479, or 
constitutes evidence of the abandonment of 
the covenant. See Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 
649, 653 (Utah Ct.App.1995). 
[13-16] 1122 The case law is uniform that 
before an abandonment of a covenant may be 
found there must be "substantial and general 
noncompliance" with the covenant. B.B.P. 
Corp. v. Carroll 760 P.2d 519, 524 (Alaska 
1988); Tompkins, 659 P.2d at, 867. One 
court has stated that in order for there to be 
an abandonment, a covenant must be "habit-
ually and substantially violated." Reading v. 
Keller, 67 Wash.2d S6, 406 P.2d 634, 637 
(1965) (internal quotations omitted). The vi-
olations must be so substantial as to destroy 
the usefulness of the covenant and support a 
finding that the covenant has become bur-
densome. See Keller v. Branton, 667 P.2d 
650, 654 (Wyo.1983). If the original purpose 
of the covenant can still be accomplished and 
substantial benefit will continue to inure to 
residents, the covenant will stand. See 
Tompkins, 659 P.2d at 867. This court in 
Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugar-
house Shopping Center Associates, 535 P.2d 
1256 (Utah 1975), in determining whether a 
covenant should no longer be enforceable 
because of changed conditions, stated: 
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Before a change will vitiate a covenant, it 
must be of such a magnitude as to neutral-
ize the benefits of the restriction, to the 
point of defeating the object and purpose 
of the restrictive covenant. The change 
required to afford relief is reached, where 
the circumstances render the covenant of 
little or no value. Here, the purpose of the 
restriction is yet a valid one, and the con-
templated benefits to the plaintiff still ex-
ist. The purpose of the covenant has nei-
ther ceased nor become useless. 
Id. at 1261 (citing Metropolitan Inv. Co. v. 
Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 41, 376 P.2d 940, 943 
(1962)). Evidence of abandonment must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence. 
See Metropolitan, 14 Utah 2d at 41, 376 P.2d 
at 943. 
[17] 1123 Courts are uniform that no 
abandonment of a covenant will be found 
where violations are of a "minor nature" and 
do not destroy the general building scheme, 
see Reading, 406 P.2d at 636; if the viola-
tions are "slight, unimportant, and unsub-
stantial," Guyton v. Yancey, 240 La. 794, 125 
So.2d 365, 371 (1960); or if the violations are 
"inoffensive." See Keller, 667 P.2d at 654. 
11 24 Typical of the cases where an aban-
donment of a covenant has been found is 
B.B.P., 760 P.2d 519. There, a covenant 
required all lot owners to cut and destroy all 
poplar, cottonwood, and aspen trees on their 
lots to make room for the more desirable 
spruce and birch. See id. at 520. However, 
lot owners learned through experience that 
strict compliance was impossible because 
poplar, cottonwood, and aspen trees are ex-
tremely hardy, and they sprout from roots 
and reseed themselves. Even bulldozing all 
of those trees would not bring a lot into 
compliance because they would soon spring 
back, and bulldozing would cause excessive 
erosion. See id. at 521. As a result, none of 
the lots were in full compliance with the 
covenant, and only eighteen of the approxi-
mately eighty-eight residents had taken sub-
stantial steps toward compliance. See id. 
The court held that the covenant had been 
abandoned because the evidence revealed 
substantial and general noncompliance. The 
court noted that in order to fully comply, 
each resident would be required to cut and 
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thin trees each year, far exceeding the cut-
ting that was apparently contemplated by the 
covenant originally. Thus, the residents 
would be subject to a far heavier burden than 
they originally bargained for. Full compli-
ance was found to be impossible to achieve 
and even substantial compliance would be 
extremely burdensome. See id. at 524. 
1125 In contrast to that case where an 
abandonment of a covenant was found, the 
Wyoming Supreme Court in Keller, 667 P.2d 
650, found no abandonment of a covenant 
which prohibited front yard fencing. Twenty 
lots out of approximately 120 to 130 lots had 
some kind of front yard fence. They were 
decorative fences, and the court held that 
they were not fences in the ordinary sense of 
indicating boundaries or holding something 
in or out. See id. at 654. The court empha-
sized that in order to find an abandonment of 
a protective covenant, the breaches ac-
quiesced in must be so great or so fundamen-
tal or radical as to neutralize the benefit of 
the restriction to the point of defeating the 
purpose of the covenant. "In other words, 
the violations must be so substantial as to 
support a finding that the usefulness of the 
covenant has been destroyed, or that the 
covenant has become valueless to the proper-
ty owners." Id. 
1126 Courts have also found that the erec-
tion of churches in a subdivision restricted to 
residential purposes technically violated the 
covenant, but the violation was too slight and 
inconsequential to effect material change, 
character, and use of the restricted territory. 
See, e.g., Mechling v. Daivson, 234 Ky. 318, 
28 S.W.2d 18, 19 (1930). Similarly, in Cowl-
ing v. Colligan, 158 Tex. 458, 312 S.W.2d 943 
(1958), the Supreme Court of Texas held that 
even though the subdivision had allowed sev-
eral churches to be built there in violation of 
a covenant restricting the use of the lots for 
residential purposes the violation was so triv-
ial in character that it did not operate as a 
waiver of the right of lot owners to enforce 
the covenant against business or commercial 
development, and it did not indicate an aban-
donment of the covenant. See id. at 946. 
[18] 1127 Thus, we adopt the test articu-
lated by the court of appeals in Fink, 896 
P.2d 649 for determining whether the owners 
in Quail Point Subdivision have abandoned 
the restrictive covenants. We must examine: 
(1) the "number, nature and severity of the 
then existing violations"; (2) "any prior act of 
enforcement of the restriction"; and (3) 
"whether it is still possible to realize to a 
substantial degree the benefits intended 
through the covenant." Id. at 653-54. 
[19] 1128 In the instant case, nineteen of 
fifty-two Quail Point lots had garden and 
storage sheds that did not comply with the 
four building types allowed under article I. 
While the building of small storage sheds 
may technically violate article I, the violation 
is unsubstantial. The evidence indicates that 
the storage sheds have an average size of 
eight by ten feet and are approximately sev-
en and a half feet in height, having an aver-
age of ninety-one square feet. These small 
sheds typically fit unobtrusively in a back 
corner of the lot, not on a foundation, and are 
used to store garden and yard tools. They 
are not occupied by lot owners and could be 
not much larger than an outbuilding for pets, 
which is expressly allowed under the cove-
nant. 
1129 On the other hand, the woodshop built 
by defendant Erickson stands twelve feet 
high and is substantially larger than a stor-
age shed. The building contains at least 288 
square feet and may be as large as 384 
square feet. It has a foundation and is occu-
pied by Erickson for woodworking. Erick-
son testified that he intends to move his 
bandsaw into the workshop and buy other 
power tools. The Swensons' and Erickson's 
lots adjoin at the rear. The Swensons are 
directly impacted by the large structure built 
by Erickson. 
V30 There is a substantial difference be-
tween a small, unobtrusive, unoccupied and 
readily movable storage shed in the corner of 
a lot and a substantially larger and taller 
woodworking shop. The technical violation 
of the covenant here, the small storage 
sheds, can in no wise be deemed an abandon-
ment. The original purpose of the covenant 
can still be accomplished, and substantial 
benefit can continue to inure to residents or 
the subdivision. The slight violation by lot 
owners in erecting small, unoccupied storage 
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sheds does not render the covenant useless. 
See Papanikolas Bros., 535 P.2d at 1261. 
There is no other occupied structure in the 
subdivision comparable to the large shop 
built by Erickson in which to conduct wood-
working. We thus conclude that there has 
been no abandonment of the restrictive cove-
nants by the lot owners. 
III. APPROVAL OF PLANS 
[20] 1131 In article I of the covenants, 
provision is made for the appointment and 
duties of an architectural committee: 
No building shall be erected, placed, or 
altered on any premises in said develop-
ment until the building plans, specifica-
tions, and plot plans showing the location 
of such building have been approved as to 
conformity and harmony of external design 
with existing structures in the develop-
ment, and as to location of the building 
with respect to topography and finished 
ground elevation by an architectural com-
mittee composed of CHARLES R. KIR-
TON and other members selected by him 
or by a representative designated by the 
members of said committee. 
After the district court granted a temporary 
restraining order and a preliminary injunc-
tion against Erickson, and after he had erect-
ed his workshop, he sought to comply with 
this covenant. Mary Campbell and Charles 
R. Kirton, the two surviving members of the 
original architectural committee, designated 
Robert Campbell as the committee's repre-
sentative. Robert Campbell then formally 
approved Erickson's shed. However, this 
approval avails Erickson nothing, for two 
reasons. 
H 32 First, the covenant requires that the 
architectural committee or its designated 
representative approve the building plan pri-
or to the erection of any building on the lots. 
That was not done here. Approval came 
after the workshop had been erected. Sec-
ondly andjmore seriously, the restrictive cov-
enant does not purport to give the architec-
tural committee authority to relieve any lot 
owner of a duty to comply. There is no 
language in the covenant that could be con-
strued to give such sweeping authority to the 
committee. Instead, the covenant grants to 
ERICKSON Utah 815 
807 (Utah 2000) 
the committee the authority to examine 
building plans, specifications, and plot plans 
in order to determine "conformity and har-
mony of external design with existing struc-
tures" and location of the proposed building 
with respect to topography and finished 
ground elevation. The architectural commit-
tee can perform those duties without violat-
ing the covenants with regard to the four 
types of buildings allowed. 
IV. TERMINATION OF 
THE COVENANTS 
[21] 1133 Erickson contends that even if 
the committee's approval of his structure is 
invalid, the lot owners effectively terminated 
the covenants. Erickson circulated a petition 
that thirty-eight of the fifty-two homeowners 
signed, giving their approval of the termi-
nation of the covenants. Article XIV of the 
covenants provides: 
These covenants are to run with the land 
and shall be binding on all parties claiming 
under them until January 1, 1994, at which 
time said covenants shall be automatically 
extended for successive periods of 10 years 
unless by vote of a majority of the then 
owners of the building sites covered by 
these covenants it is agreed to change said §mts in whole or part, rickson argues that the petition con-the owners' majority vote to termi-
covenants. However, looking at the 
plain language of the article, the covenants 
are to be "automatically extended . . . unless 
by vote of a 77iajority of the then owners." 
(Emphasis added.) Therefore, the owners 
have the power to amend the covenants, but 
only at such time as the covenants are due 
for extension. The last such time was Janu-
ary 1, 1994; we assume that the next such 
time will be on January 1, 2004. This being 
so, the petition, assuming it represents a 
majority vote of the owners, is still invalid. 
The owners' attempted termination of the 
restrictive covenants is without effect. 
V. ATTORNEY FEES 
1135 There is no provision in the covenants 
for an award of attorney fees to any owner 
who successfully seeks enforcement of the 
8 1 6 Utah 998 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
covenants. The Swensons contend, however, 
that they are entitled to attorney fees under 
our wrongful lien statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-9-7 (1997). They assert that the notice 
of termination of the restrictive covenants 
recorded by Robert Campbell in the office of 
the recorder of Salt Lake County constitutes 
a wrongful lien within the meaning of our 
statute. We disagree. Under section 38-9-
1(6), a wrongful lien is defined as "any docu-
ment that purports to create a lien or en-
cumbrance on an owner's interest in real 
property." The notice of termination did not 
purport to place a lien or encumbrance on 
the Swensons' property. Their claim for at-
torney fees is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
1136 The order of the trial court dissolving 
the preliminary injunction against Erickson 
and dismissing plaintiffs' complaint against 
him is reversed. The case is remanded to 
the trial court to enter a permanent injunc-
tion against Erickson and for any further 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
1137 Associate Chief Justice DURHAM, 
Justice ZIMMERMAN, and Justice 
RUSSON concur in Chief Justice HOWE's 
opinion. 
1i 38 Justice STEWART concurs in the 
result. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
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v. 
Joseph P. TUNZI, Defendant 
and Petitioner. 
No. 20000022. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 14, 2000. 
Defendant wa.s convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake Department, Judith 
S.H. Atherton, J., of aggravated assault. 
Defendant appealed. Defendant filed motion 
for summary reversal upon discovery that 
videotape of second day of trial had been lost 
and that transcript consequently could not be 
prepared. The Court of Appeals denied mo-
tion and remanded for trial court to prepare 
statement of evidence or proceedings. Defen-
dant sought writ of certiorari. The Supreme 
Court, Durham, J., held that new trial, not 
attempt to reconstruct record, was appropri-
ate remedy in case in wrhich half of record 
had been lost and main issue was sufficiency 
of evidence to support conviction. 
Reversed and remanded for new trial. 
Criminal Law G=>1088.20 
New trial, not attempt to reconstruct 
record through statement of evidence or pro-
ceedings, was appropriate remedy for loss of 
videotape that made it impossible to prepare 
transcript for second day of two-day trial, 
where one half of trial record had been lost 
and main issue on appeal was sufficiency of 
evidence to support conviction. 
Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Laura B. Dupaix, 
Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Joan C. Watt, John O'Connell, Jr., Salt 
Lake City, for defendant. 
ON CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS 
MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER 
DURHAM Justice: 
111 Petitioner, Joseph P. Tunzi, by writ of 
certiorari, seeks review of an order of re-
mand issued by the court of appeals directing 
the trial court to prepare and approve a 
"statement of the evidence or proceedings" 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure 11(g). We grant petitioner's writ of 
certiorari, reverse the court of appeals, and 
remand the case to the trial court for a new 
trial. 
EXHIBIT "C 
NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF 
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS 
GARY W. OTT 
RECORDER, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
D6VE ERICKSDN 
9150 NOCBINGBIRD CK 
SftKDY OF BW94 
Br: ZJIt DEPUTY - WI I F . 
UT* 
Notice is hereby given that the Restrictive Covenants t'oi Quail Point Subdivision 
lecorded on July 9. 1 973 in the office of the Satl Lake County Recorder as Entry No 2553088. 
Book 3368 Pages 429-432 were tciminated on lamiary I 2004 by a vote of a majority of the 
owncis o f th t building sites covered bv the Covenants The vote was 42 lor termination and 3 
Wg a , n s i 
j - > ; r This Notice and the resulting termination relates to the following described ica] propeity 
i < \ situated ni Salt Lake County State of Utah 
Lots 1-52 Quad Point Subdnision a subdivision of Sail Lake County, Stale of Utah 
according to the official plat thereof on file and of rata d in (he office of the Sail Lake 
Covnly Re cor dei 
OF'IITAK 
rY OF SALT L A K ^ I ~ A 
istrumem who duly acknowl»dg« to rm 
DATED this 2& da> of March. 2004 
»d before me ^ 
s) ai rha fofecjoing inst 
ibey execut&d th&^Bm CM 
„—^^gg^^ud Mionae) L Pope 
*\*-S. 
Charles L Rhodes 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss 
OP 
On die ^ ( day of Maich 2004 personally apDeaied befoie me Mic-haett , Pope and 
Charles L Rhodes who being first duly sworn did say lh«.u they arc property owners in the Quai 
Point Subdivision and on January I 2004 they supervised the vote of properly owners of the 
Qudil Potnl Subdivision regaiding the termindiion of icsliicir\ e covenants relating lo that 
subdivision and that the facts set foith in this Notice of Termination are ti ue and correct 
(JmL tfpuy-* 
Notary Public)Signature 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CINDY HEINER
 y 
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EXHIBIT "D" 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 2 5 2H04 
DAVID and BARBRA SWENSON, 
SA1TI A 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAVID ERICKSON, and DAVID 
LIMBERG, 
Defendants• 
ORDER 
CASE NO. 040902545 
JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
Oral arguments on plaintiffs ' Mocion To Nullify Termination of 
Restrictive Covenants were heard on September 20, 2004. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under 
advisement. Now, having considered the parties' arguments along 
with the relevant legal authorities the Court rules as stated 
herein and denies plaintiffs' motion. 
This action revolves around the Quail Point Subdivision 
Restrictive Covenants, originally filed with the Salt Lake County 
Recorder on July 9, 1973 In 1997, Quail Point lot owner David 
Srickson commenced construction of a storage shed on his property, 
[n response, Quail Point lot owners David and Barbara Swenson 
["plaintiffs") brought an action in Third District Court to en]om 
Ir. Enckson's construction as a violation of Article I of the 
ubdivision's restrictive covenants.x 
!Under Article I of the restrictive covenants, no structure 
hall be. "erected, placed or altered on any premises in [Quail 
omt] until the building plans, specifications, and plot plans 
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After an injunction was entered, Mr. Erickson attempted to 
terminate the covenants by filing a Notice of Termination based 
upon a vote of lot owners. The Third District Court dismissed the 
case and plaintiffs' appealed In a written decision, the Utah 
Supreme Court: concluded that Mr Erickson's attempt to terminate 
the covenants was ineffective and remanded the case to the District 
Court for entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting Erickson from 
building the shed on his Quail Point lot. Swenson v Erickson 2000 
UT 16, 998 P.2d 807. 
On January 1, 2 0 04 Quail Point subdivision lot owners again 
voted to terminate the restrictive covenants. A majority voted to 
terminate the covenants and a Notice of Termination was recorded 
with Salt Lake County on March 26, 2 0 04. In response to the Notice 
of Termination, plaintiffs now bring this Motion To Nullify against 
David Erickson and David Limberg ("defendants"), challenging the 
termination on two main grounds [lj tne covenants do not allow for 
"termination" by majority vote, and (2) the covenants were 
automatically renewed for a successive ten (10) year period on 
January l, 2 004. 
As an initial matter, the Court rejects plaintiffs contention 
showing the location of such building have been approved as to 
conformity and harmony of external design with existing 
structures in the development, and as to location of the building 
with respect to topography and finished ground elevation by an 
architectural committee " 
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that the termination was ineffective because the covenants only 
allow for a "change" and not a "termination" by majority vote. 
Article XIV of the restrictive covenants states in relevant part, 
"[t]hese covenants are to run with the land 
and shall be binding on all parties and all 
persons claiming under them until January 1, 
1994 at which time said covenants shall be 
automatically extended for successive periods 
of 10 years unless by a vote of a majority of 
the then owners of the building sites 
covered by these covenants it is agreed to 
change said covenants in whole or part." 
(Emphasis added). 
This Court concludes thau the phrase "in whole or part" allows for 
termination of the covenants, as a whole, by majority vote. Such 
conclusion, is consistent with the plain language of the covenants. 
Next, the Swensons ' argue thau the termination vote should 
have occurred prior to January 1, 2004. Specifically, the 
Swensons' contend thai: the automatic renewal period engaged on 
January 1st, 2 0 04 and that any amendments to, or termination of, the 
:ovenants is not available for another ten years. In Swenson at 
U 34 the Utah Supreme Court states .-
"[t]he owners have the power to amend the 
covenants, but only at such time as the covenants 
are due for extension. The last such time was 
January 1, 1994; we assume that the next such time 
will be on January 1, 2004." (Emphasis added). 
he phrase "on January 1, 2 004" indicates that the Utah Court 
reviously determined that a vote conducted and tallied on that 
ite was valid. Accordingly, the January 1, 2004 ruling was 
rfective and the covenants were terminated. 
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Plaintiff's Motion is hereby denied. 
BY THE COURT: 
EXHIBIT "E" 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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McHUGH, Judge: 
%1 David and Barbara Swenson appeal the trial court's dismissal 
with prejudice of their complaint against David V. Erickson and 
David R. Limberg (collectively, Defendants). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 The Swensons, Erickson, and Limberg are owners of abutting 
lots in the Quail Point Subdivision (the Subdivision) in Sandy, 
Utah. A real estate development company created the Quail Point 
Subdivision in July 1973, at which time that company recorded the 
Quail Point Subdivision Restrictive Covenants (the Covenants). 
%2 In 1997, Erickson began building a structure he intended to 
use as a workshop and storage facility on his lot in the 
Subdivision. The Swensons filed suit against Erickson, alleging 
that Erickson's structure violated the Covenants. As a result, 
the Swensons obtained an injunction prohibiting Erickson from 
building his structure. After the injunction issued, a majority 
of the Subdivision lot owners voted to terminate the Covenants, 
and a notice of termination of the Covenants was filed with the 
Salt Lake County Recorder. Erickson then filed a motion to 
dismiss the Swensons' complaint against him and to remove the 
injunction prohibiting him from building his structure. In 
response, the Swensons filed a motion to nullify the notice of 
termination of the Covenants. The trial court granted Erickson's 
motion, dismissing the Swensons' complaint and setting aside the 
injunction. The Swensons appealed. In Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 
UT 16, 998 P.2d 807 (Swenson I), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
the Covenants prohibited Erickson's structure. See id. at fl9. 
The Swenson I court also held that the Subdivision lot owners' 
attempted termination of the Covenants was invalid because it was 
undertaken prior to the expiration of the ten-year period 
specified by the plain language of the Covenants. See id. at 
1f33-34. The Swenson I court remanded the case, see id. at f36, 
and thereafter, the trial court issued a permanent injunction 
that prohibited Erickson from keeping the structure on his lot. 
^4 On January 1, 2 0 04, at the end of the ten-year period 
specified in the Covenants, another vote was conducted from 12:00 
p.m. to 2:00 p.m., and a majority of the Subdivision lot owners 
voted to terminate the Covenants. On March 26, 2 0 04, a notice of 
termination of the Covenants was filed with the Salt Lake County 
Recorder. The Swensons filed suit against Defendants seeking an 
order declaring that the March 26, 2004 notice of termination was 
void and requiring it to be removed, an order declaring that the 
Covenants were still valid and in effect, an order declaring that 
the permanent injunction previously issued by the trial court was 
still valid and in effect, an injunction prohibiting Defendants 
from erecting any structures on any Subdivision lots in violation 
of the Covenants, and costs and attorney fees. Thereafter, the 
Swensons filed a motion to nullify the March 26, 2004 notice of 
termination. The court heard oral argument on the motion and 
took the matter under advisement. 
15 In its October 25, 2004 written decision denying the 
Swensons' motion, the trial court ruled that the portion of the 
Covenants that allowed for changes to be made to them "in whole 
or part" included the power to terminate the Covenants. The 
trial court also concluded, based upon language contained in 
Swenson I, see id. at f34, that the vote conducted on January 1, 
2004, was effective to terminate the Covenants. After issuing 
its decision, the trial court dismissed the Swensons' complaint 
against Defendants with prejudice. The Swensons appeal. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
K6 The Swensons argue that Defendants' termination of the 
Covenants was invalid because the Covenants do not allow for 
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termination, but instead allow only for changes to be made to 
them "in whole or part." Alternatively, the Swensons argue that 
even if the terms of the Covenants allow for termination, the 
Defendants' termination was neither completed prior to the 
automatic renewal of the Covenants for a ten-year period, nor in 
accordance with the Utah Supreme Courtfs holding in Swenson I. 
See id. "The trial court's interpretation of the language of a 
restrictive covenant, absent resort to extrinsic evidence, 
presents a question of law which we review for correctness." Id. 
at fl2. Further, "[w]hether a trial court correctly interpreted 
a prior judicial opinion is a question of law that we review for 
correctness." Jensen v. IHC Hosps. , Inc., 2003 UT 51,1(56, 82 
P.3d 1076. 
ANALYSIS 
i|7 In relevant part, the Covenants provide: 
These covenants are to run with the land and 
shall be binding on all parties and all 
persons claiming under them until January 1, 
1994, at which time said covenants shall be 
automatically extended for successive periods 
of 10 years unless by vote of a majority of 
the then owners of the building sites covered 
by these covenants it is agreed to change 
said covenants in whole or part. 
f8 Based upon this language, the Swensons argue that the 
termination of the Covenants was invalid because the Covenants do 
not allow for termination, but instead allow only for changes to 
be made to them "in whole or part." We disagree. Instead, we 
agree with the trial court that the portion of the Covenants 
allowing for changes to them "in whole" includes the power to 
terminate or extinguish them. See, e.g., French v. Diamond Hill-
Jarvis Civic League, 724 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Tex. App. 1987) 
(addressing "the appellees' contention that there [was] no right 
to abolish the restrictions as opposed to merely amending them," 
stating that " [i]t has been held that the right to amend 
[restrictive covenants] includes the right to change them so as 
to remove [them] , " and holding that "the majority of the owners 
had the right to amend the restrictions even to the point of 
destroying or removing them"); see also Dansie v. Hi-Country 
Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 1999 UT 62,^14, 987 P.2d 30 
("Restrictive covenants are not favored in the law and are 
strictly construed in favor of the free and unrestricted use of 
property." (quotations and citations omitted)). 
20041041-CA 3 
1J9 As an alternative argument, the Swensons contend that even 
if the Covenants allow for termination, the termination was not 
completed until after the Covenants had already been extended for 
a ten-year period, which the Swensons assert commenced at 12:01 
a.m. on January 1, 2004. In contrast, Defendants argue that on 
January 1, 2004, the majority of the then owners of the 
Subdivision lots voted to release the Covenants and that this 
vote was effective to terminate them. 
flO Restrictive covenants are contracts that should be enforced 
consistently with the intention of the parties. 
Restrictive covenants that run with the land 
and encumber subdivision lots form a contract 
between subdivision property owners as a 
whole and individual lot owners; therefore, 
interpretation of the covenants is governed 
by the same rules of construction as those 
used to interpret contracts. Generally, 
unambiguous restrictive covenants should be 
enforced as written. However, where 
restrictive covenants are susceptible to two 
or more reasonable interpretations, the 
intention of the parties is controlling. The 
intention of the parties is ascertained from 
the document itself and the language used 
within the document. 
Swenson I, 2000 UT 16,fll, 998 P.2d 807 (citations omitted). 
fll Thus, as with the interpretation of contracts generally, we 
"first look[] to the contract's four corners to determine the 
parties1 intentions, which are controlling." Fairbourn 
Commercial, Inc. v. American Hous. Partners, Inc., 2 004 UT 
54,fl0, 94 P.3d 292 (quotations and citations omitted). If that 
language is unambiguous, we will determine "the parties' 
intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual language as 
a matter of law." Id. (quotations and citations omitted); see 
also Cooley v. Call, 61 Utah 203, 211 P. 977, 980-81 (1922) 
("[0]ur decision of this case is based entirely upon what we 
conceive to be the obvious intention of the parties at the time 
they executed the contract. We have endeavored to determine that 
intention from the plain, unambiguous terms of the contract 
considered in the light of what the parties must have foreseen 
and contemplated at the time the contract was executed. . . . 
[W]e deem it our duty to give effect to that intention without 
regard to technical rules, the too rigid application of which 
oftentimes defeats the very purpose for which they were 
intended."); Cummincrs v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619, 621-22 
(1912) (stating that courts must give "the language found in [an] 
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agreement its ordinary and usual meaning when applied to the 
subject-matter and nature of the agreement and apparent object or 
purpose of the parties" and that " [cjourts will always incline 
towards giving language a reasonable construction, and will 
avoid, if possible, an absurdity if the language is susceptible 
of some other meaning"); Daly v. Old, 35 Utah 74, 99 P. 460, 463 
(1909) ("The only thing . . . that the courts are concerned with 
is to ascertain the intention of the parties to any contract, 
and, when this is ascertained, the duty to enforce such intention 
admits of no escape, A primary canon of construction is to 
construe the language of the parties when applied to the subject-
matter of the contract. The language used when applied to the 
subject-matter must be given its usual and ordinary meaning, 
unless it is clear that certain words or terms are employed in a 
technical sense."). 
^12 In Swenson I, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the same 
language at issue here, stating: 
Erickson argues that the petition constitutes 
the owners' majority vote to terminate the 
[C]ovenants. However, looking at the plain 
language of the article, the [C]ovenants are 
to be "automatically extended . . . unless by 
vote of a majority of the then owners." 
(Emphasis added.) Therefore, the owners have 
the power to amend the [C]ovenants, but only 
at such time as the [C]ovenants are due for 
extension. The last such time was January 1, 
1994; we assume that the next such time will 
be on January 1, 2 004. 
Swenson I, 2000 UT 16 at [^34 (third alteration in original) 
(quoting the Covenants). 
1JX3 Although the Swensons maintain that the Covenants were 
automatically extended at 12:01 a.m. on January 1, 2004, neither 
the Covenants nor the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Swenson I 
supports such a conclusion. The Covenants state that they will 
be automatically extended every ten years unless a majority of 
the then owners of the Subdivision lots votes to amend them in 
whole or in part. The Utah Supreme Court held that the intent of 
the parties was that changes to the Covenants could only be made 
at the conclusion of those ten-year periods, noting that the next 
opportunity to do so would be January 1, 2004. See id. 
%14 There is nothing in the document indicating that the parties 
to the original contract intended to have the 12:01 a.m. deadline 
suggested by the Swensons, and the Utah Supreme Court did not so 
hold. Rather, the express language supports an intent for the 
20041041-CA 5 
Covenants to run "until January 1, [2004], at which time" the 
automatic extension of them could be defeated by a majority vote 
of the then owners of the Subdivision lots. The inclusion of 
only a date without a specific time suggests that the vote could 
be taken any time that day. If the parties had intended to 
impose a strict 12:01 a.m. deadline, as suggested by the 
Swensons, the Covenants could have said so. See Dansie v. Hi-
Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 1999 UT 62,fl4, 987 P.2d 30. 
1|l5 The record indicates that the vote in this case took place 
sometime between 12:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. on January 1, 2 004. 
Because the vote took place on the date identified by the terms 
of the Covenants, we conclude that it was effective to change, 
even to the point of terminating, the Covenants. 
CONCLUSION 
fl6 We conclude that the portion of the Covenants allowing for 
changes to be made to them "in whole" includes the power to 
terminate or extinguish them. We also conclude that the vote 
that took place on January 1, 2004, was conducted in accordance 
with the terms of the Covenants and the Utah Supreme Court's 
holding in Swenson I, and was effective to terminate the 
Covenants. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's dismissal with 
prejudice of the Swensons' complaint against Defendants. 
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